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1. THE PROSPECTS OF HARMONIzING PROCEDURAL 
LAWS
Developments in the European Union (EU) clearly indicate a trend towards substantive 
uniformity in domestic criminal laws. As a result of conventions concluded within 
the EU, as well as of decisions of the European Council, Member States have enacted 
criminal law provisions which are notably similar in content. Examples include 
criminalizing the corruption of EU or foreign officials or corruption in the private 
sector, money laundering, and providing for the liability of legal persons or the 
confiscation of the proceeds of crime.1 In like manner, the Framework Decision on 
the European Arrest Warrant,2 though addressing issues of international cooperation, 
is likely to lead to further homogeneity in the substantive criminal laws of Member 
States. For certain conduct defined as criminal in the issuing state, the executing state 
may not refuse to surrender suspected offenders, claiming the lack of dual criminality. 
States will therefore certainly take steps, provided that they wish to maintain at least 
the appearance of sovereignty, to make conduct enumerated in the framework decision 
a criminal offense under their national law as well.
This trend towards legislative homogeneity in criminal law is not limited to the 
EU. Numerous international treaties concluded in the past have also had a harmonizing 
* Professor, Central European University, Budapest. This paper was originally delivered at the ECBA 
Autumn Conference in Ljubljana, 1 & 2 October 2010.
1 See for example: The Convention on the Fight against Corruption involving officials of the European 
Communities or officials of Member States of the European Union [OJ 97/C 195/01 25.6.97]; 
Framework decision criminalising corruption in the private sector [OJ L 192/54 31.7.2003]; and 
Framework decision on money laundering, dealing with the identification, tracing, freezing and 
confiscation of criminal assets and the proceeds of crime 2001/500/JHA [OJ L 182, 5.7.2001].
2 Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender 
procedures between Member States (2002/584/JHA).
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impact on the Member States’ criminal laws within the Council of Europe.3 
Furthermore, on a global level, the harmonization of national criminal laws has 
become a priority over the last two decades. Clearly, the conventions on drug crime4, 
transnational organized crime5 and corruption6 both reflect and catalyse the trend.7 
Mention should also be made of the Statute of the International Criminal Court 
adopted in 1998 which, though in a limited area, has made a substantial contribution 
to harmonizing and even unifying national laws. Due to the complementary 
jurisdiction of the permanent International Criminal Court, state parties to the treaty 
have been prompted to define war crimes and crimes against humanity in a uniform 
manner by following the wording of the Statute.8
Whereas the tendency of harmonizing substantive criminal laws is clearly evident, 
much less has so far been achieved in the area of criminal procedure.9 Even within the 
EU, differences in criminal procedural law are still considerable in areas of such 
significance as the legal preconditions for employing coercive measures, the rules of 
collecting and assessing evidence, the role of the pre-trial stage of the process, the 
rights of suspects, or whether prosecution is mandatory or can be made dependant on 
considerations of expediency.10
Moreover, the measures currently envisaged to encourage harmonization of 
criminal procedure within the EU are rather modest.11 The explanation may lie in 
that the rules of the criminal process are dependant to a considerable extent on the 
organizational structure of the criminal justice system, the extent to which the court 
3 While the primary aim of some of these treaties – such as the European Convention on Spectator 
Violence and Misbehaviour at Sports Events and in Particular at Football Matches (ETS No. 120, 
1985), the European Convention on Offences relating to Cultural Property (ETS No. 119, 1985) and 
others – is to facilitate more effective international cooperation, a direct effect of this has been a 
degree of harmonization of national laws.
4 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic drugs; 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances; 1988 
United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.
5 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its protocols (2000): 
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, 
Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Air and Sea, Protocol against the Illicit 
Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition.
6 United Nations Convention against Corruption (2003).
7 It should be added that facilitating cooperation is also among the aims of these conventions.
8 The definition of genocide in the Statute (see Article 6 and also Article 25 for incitement to commit 
genocide) in essence follows the wording of the definition of genocide (see Article 2) of the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948).
9 This seems to be surprising in the light of the frequently voiced assumption that changes in 
substantive law will inevitably have an impact on the rules of the criminal process which, it is held, 
primarily serves the enforcement of substantive penal law.
10 See Robert Esser: Auf dem Weg zu einem europäischen Strafverfahrensrecht. Berlin, 2002, De Gruyter 
Recht, p. 5.
11 Proposal of the Commission for a Council Framework Decision on certain procedural rights in 
criminal proceedings throughout the European Union 2004/0113 (CNS).
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system is based on the so-called hierarchical or the coordinate model,12 the role of lay 
decision-makers, etc. These factors are, in turn, influenced by the cultural background, 
i.e. historical and political experience of a given people, the “Zeitgeist” in a particular 
society and socio-psychological factors.13 The criminal process is not only a reflection 
of the cultural values; by giving them expression in the course of its operation it serves 
to further strengthen and entrench these values.14
Some authors blame traditional comparative criminal procedural scholarship – 
which stresses the differences between existing criminal justice systems – for the lack 
of harmonizing efforts. According to Summers the prevailing approach has its source 
in legal nationalism. Commentators, she argues, “(…) instead of positively identifying 
those elements that make up their system, (…) seek to differentiate themselves from 
the perceived negative aspects of other systems.”15 She is of the view that by carefully 
studying the ideas expounded by 19th century scholars in England, France or Germany 
we may discern the values and principles underlying the European criminal procedural 
tradition.16 She also makes an attempt to reveal these principles in the jurisprudence 
of the European Court of Human Rights. Indeed, Esser in his voluminous book also 
considers the Strasbourg jurisprudence as an important catalyst for harmonizing 
criminal procedural law in Europe.17 The comprehensive comparative study of 
Delmas-Marty and Spencer however shows that in spite of certain signs of convergence 
in national laws the actual level of harmonization is still relatively low.18
Thus it appears that harmonization is a difficult undertaking in the area of criminal 
procedure. One can of course ask if there is a need at all for harmonization. Do potential 
benefits of making national criminal justice systems resemble each other outweigh the 
value of diversity? And assuming that harmonization is given priority over heterogeneity 
then which model will the harmonized European criminal process follow?
And in particular how will harmonization look like after the Lisbon Treaty?19
12 Mirjan R. Damaska: The Faces of Justice and State Authority: A Comparative Approach to the Legal 
Process. New Haven, 1986, yale University Press.
13 On the cultural factors explaining differences of systems of criminal procedure see Tatjana Hörnle: 
Unterschiede zwischen Verfahrensordnungen und ihre kulturellen Hintergründe. Zeitschrift für 
die gesamte Strafrechtswissentschaft, vol. 117, 2005/4, pp. 801–838.
14 Ibid, p. 834. By this we assume that the goal of the criminal process is not limited to the enforcement 
of substantive law provisions. The autonomous function of the process is to express and demonstrate 
its link to the cultural background.
15 Sarah J Summers: Fair Trials. The European Criminal Procedural Tradition and the European Court of 
Human Rights. Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2007, Hart Publishing, p. 11. It is to be noted that Summer’s 
critics is focused on the traditional distinction between adversarial and inquisitorial type of procedure.
16 Ibid. p. 17.
17 See Robert Esser: Auf dem Weg zu einem europäischen Strafverfahrensrecht. Berlin, 2002, De Gruyter 
Recht, p. 45.
18 Mireille Delmas-Marty – J.R. Spencer (eds.): European Criminal Procedures. Cambridge, 2005, 
Cambridge University Press.
19 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European 
Community, signed at Lisbon, 13 December 2007. OJ C306/50, 17 December 2007.
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2. THE SECURITy PARADIGM COUNTERBALANCED
Before assessing Article 82 TFEU,20 which envisages the setting of certain standards 
in the area of criminal procedural law, let me make a general comment. The text of 
Article 82 provides for the legal framework: it says that a certain level of harmonization 
is envisaged in several areas, including the rights of criminal defendants. However, 
the Article provides no indication of how the harmonized process would look and 
does not elaborate on the extent to which defendants’ rights should be developed. 
Thus, Lisbon provides for the legal framework only; the content has to be determined 
by the Member States and the competent organs of the Union respectively. However, 
an assessment of the Lisbon Treaty as a whole – and the spirit of the Treaty – may 
assist us in predicting possible trajectories in this area. One can also adopt a historical 
approach, taking stock of what has been done so far, to help forecast (beyond mere 
speculation) the likely future of a harmonized criminal procedure and the position of 
defendants within that criminal process.
I think I am not wrong when stating that the security paradigm is likely to prevail. 
The general trend is therefore likely to be more security-driven, accompanied by 
further interferences and intrusions into the individuals’ life. Such an approach is not 
inconsistent with the basic idea behind the mutual recognition principle which 
prioritizes the imperative of increased efficiency: The free movement and the mutual 
acceptance of judicial decisions are meant to remove obstacles that jeopardize the 
efficiency of criminal prosecutions. However, a number of provisions in the TEU21 
and the TFEU indicate that there are at least some efforts to counterbalance the 
security paradigm by increasing respect for human rights.
In this context the most frequently quoted provision is Article 6 TEU, which in 
addition to recognizing the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Union also 
proclaims that the Charter shall have the same legal value as the Treaties.
Further, Article 6 states that the Union shall accede to the European Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and that the 
fundamental rights as guaranteed by the European Human Rights Convention 
constitute general principles of the Union’s law. Indeed, the extension of the 
competencies of the European Court of Justice proves that there is increasing 
sensitivity towards basic rights. In this context may I mention Article 267 TFEU, 
which provides that the Court of Justice shall act with minimum delay when requested 
to give a preliminary ruling in a case pending before a court of a Member State where 
a person is in custody.
20 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Consolidated Version), OJ C115/73, 9 May 
2008.
21 Treaty on the European Union (Consolidated Version), OJ C83/13, 30 March 2010.
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3. HARMONIzATION AS THE PRECONDITION FOR THE 
OPERATION OF THE MUTUAL RECOGNITION 
PRINCIPLE
Coming now to Article 82 TFEU, this is the provision that provides the legal basis for 
approximation, which before did not exist (or at least, in the course of the discussions 
on defendants’ rights and the Union’s legislative competence in that area, was 
questioned by many of the Member States). I just note that this has not prevented the 
Council from legislating with regard to victims’ concerns, such as their standing in 
the criminal process and provision for compensation.22
As indicated earlier, approximation is also intended to enhance mutual recognition. 
Thus the trend that started perhaps ten years ago will continue in that mutual 
recognition will remain the “motor of European integration in criminal matters”.23 
That said, what was clear (or should have been clear) right from the outset has now 
been recognized and realized by the drafters of the new treaty. Although the principle 
of mutual recognition was originally meant to serve as an alternative to harmonization 
(which turned out to be time-consuming and even unrealistic), it has become clear 
that in order to operationalize the mutual recognition principle, a minimum level of 
harmonization is needed. In other words, it has become evident that mutual 
recognition and harmonization are not mutually exclusive alternatives.24 Mutual 
recognition presupposes trust in each other’s justice system and such trust presupposes 
a minimum level of common standards.
Difficulties in the implementation and in the practical functioning of the European 
Arrest Warrant (EAW)25 made it clear that the there is considerable distrust among 
Member States.26 Somewhat paradoxically, as long as Member States knew little about 
the functioning of each other’s legal system they did trust each other, thus ignorance 
created trust and the moment they gained first hand experience of how the other’s 
justice system operates in practice they have become more cautious and more 
mistrustful.
Against this backdrop, Article 83 par. 2 TFEU draws the necessary conclusions 
when envisaging the harmonization of national criminal procedural laws in various 
areas with the explicit aim of enhancing mutual recognition. In addition to measures 
of a more practical and technical nature which are likely to create mutual trust (such 
22 2001/220/JHA: Council Framework Decision of 15 March 2001 on the standing of victims in 
criminal proceedings. OJ L082, 22 March 2001.
23 Valsamis Mitsilegas: EU Criminal Law. Oxford-Portland, 2009, Hart Publishing, p. 117.
24 In fact the Commission itself was aware that a certain degree of harmonization is essential for 
making the principle of mutual recognition work. See Mitsilegas, op.cit. p. 117l.
25 Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender 
procedures between Member States (2002/584/JHA).
26 Ester Herlin-Karnell: The Lisbon Treaty and the Area of Criminal Law and Justice. European Policy 
Analysis, Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies, 2008/3, April, p. 5.
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as judicial training and measures designed to prevent and settle jurisdictional conflicts 
as set forth in Article 82 par. 1 TFEU), the further approximation of procedural laws 
in certain areas through the setting of minimum rules is also envisaged.
The list of areas where minimum standards by means of directives should be 
established prove that the drafters drew the relevant lessons from the criticisms 
regarding the applicability of the principle of mutual recognition to justice and home 
affairs cooperation. According to the critics the principle of mutual recognition, when 
applied to the free movement of goods it clearly contributes to “liberalization and 
socialization”27, i.e. it broadens the private sphere and extends “the rights of individuals 
engaged in trade and consumption.”28 When applied to the sphere of judicial 
cooperation, however, it contributes to the strengthening of the enforcement capacities 
of governmental actors instead of extending the freedom of the individual. Thus, as 
Lavenex describes, the mutual recognition principle while serving as “a tool of 
liberalization in one sector may become an instrument of governmentalization in 
another one.”29
In order to counterbalance “over-governmentalization” (and by this the potential 
shrinking of the individual’s freedom), agreement on common minimum standards 
of procedural law is needed, primarily on commonly shared standards as to criminal 
defendants’ rights. Thus Article 82 par. 2, in addition to standards related to the mutual 
admissibility of evidence between Member States and victims’ rights, makes explicit 
mention of defendants’ rights as an area where minimum standards are to be set.
Work on establishing common standards on defendants’ procedural rights started 
quite long ago with the Commission’s Green paper30 and the subsequent proposal for 
a framework decision with a focus on the rights to be guaranteed primarily to foreign 
suspects and defendants.31 However, in addition to those rights that have to be 
guaranteed to defendants prosecuted in countries other than their homeland, the 
Commission proposal provided also for the right to specific attention for persons who, 
for various reasons (their age, mental, physical or emotional condition), have 
difficulties in comprehending or following the procedure.
Following the submission of the Commission proposal we have witnessed 
increasing discomfort on the part of many Member States. One of the arguments of 
those opposing the adoption of the framework decision was that the Union lacked 
competence to interfere through legislation with purely national criminal proceedings. 
The current Article 82 now provides the basis for EU legislation in the area of criminal 
27 Sandra Lavenex: Mutual recognition and the monopoly of force: limits of the single market analogy. 
Journal of European Public Policy 14:5 August 2007, p. 765.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 Green Paper from the Commission on Procedural Safeguards for Suspects and Defendants in 
Criminal Proceedings throughout the European Union. COM(2003) 75, 19 February 2003.
31 Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on certain procedural rights in criminal proceedings 
throughout the European Union. COM(2004) 328, 28 April 2004.
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proceedings, national proceedings included, though the objective of harmonization is 
the facilitation of mutual recognition of judicial decisions and facilitation of police 
and judicial cooperation in cases with a cross-border dimension.
As a result of the debates around the proposed framework decision on procedural 
rights, and specifically, as a result of the concerns voiced by several Member States, the 
Council Resolution on a Roadmap strengthening defendants’ procedural rights32 
envisages a step-by-step approach giving priority to the rights of foreign suspects and 
defendants by ranking the right to translation and interpretation first. In the meantime, 
a directive making reference to Article 82 par. 2 TFEU has been adopted which 
regulates in some detail how the right to interpretation and translation should be 
ensured.33
4. THE ADDED VALUE IN ADOPTING EU LEGISLATION 
ON DEFENDANTS’ RIGHTS
In the light of what I have outlined so far there are certain questions that inevitably 
arise. Among the provisions of the TEU that may be cause for optimism, I made 
reference to Article 6, which (among others) envisages the Union’s accession to the 
ECHR and states that ECHR rights form part of the general principles of Union law. 
If one adds that all EU Member States are parties to the ECHR and that there is 
extensive Strasbourg jurisprudence on Article 6 of the Convention on the minimum 
standards of a fair trial, one wonders why harmonization of defendants’ rights on the 
EU level is needed. The skeptics argue that adding new instruments to the existing 
ones addressing the same issue will jeopardize legal certainty. National judges who 
will have to apply the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the specific EU legislation on 
defendants’ rights, the Strasbourg jurisprudence and their own country’s constitutional 
provisions will face immense difficulties. Here in Ljubljana it is perhaps appropriate to 
refer to Judge Zupančič’s and his co-author’s Johan Callewaert’s concerns: they claim 
that the multiplication of texts to be used by national courts will result in hesitation 
by judges which in turn will provide for more room for litigation by potential plaintiffs. 
This is certainly not needed in Europe. They also remind us that any new EU 
instrument may not prevent individuals from making use of Strasbourg after the final 
determination of their case, thereby further increasing the length of proceedings.34 
32 Resolution of the Council of 30 November 2009 on a Roadmap for strengthening procedural rights 
of suspected or accused persons in criminal proceedings. 2009/C 295/01. OJ C295/1, 4 December 
2009.
33 In the meanwhile the text was adopted, see Directive 2010/64/EU of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 20 October 2010 on the right to interpretation and translation in criminal 
proceedings. OJ L280/1, 26 October 2010.
34 Boštjan M. zupanćić – Johan Callewaert: Relationship of the EU Framework Decision to the 
ECHR:Towards the fundamental principles of criminal procedure. ERA Forum (2007) 8, p. 267.
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Some other authors fear that potential differences in the interpretation of the European 
Human Rights Convention by the Strasbourg and the Luxembourg courts would 
weaken legal certainty. And there are commentators who even envisage a potential 
lowering of the standard of protection afforded currently to criminal defendants by 
the ECHR. There are indications that the Union is prepared to deviate from the 
standard safeguards protecting defendants in case of suspects of terrorist crimes,35 
whereas the Strasbourg Court made it clear that everyone is entitled to a fair trial 
regardless of the nature of the charges whether it be “fraud, rape, murder or terrorist 
offences”, thus the community’s interest in security cannot justify a divergence from 
the general standards of the right to a fair trial.36
All these are legitimate concerns. However, one should also consider that there is 
an added value in adopting EU legislation on defendants’ rights. First, this could 
definitely help EU Member States to comply with rulings of the Strasbourg Court. The 
primary task of the ECtHR is to render judgment on whether the Convention rights 
have been observed in an individual case. And in spite of the authority of the Court to 
indicate general measures on how a repetition of the violation of a Convention right 
can avoided, there are serious limitations as to the formulation of instructions of a 
general nature. On the one hand, it is not easy to formulate on an abstract level the 
lessons drawn from an individual case. And on the other hand, this is particularly 
difficult in Article 6 cases, due to the fact that the Strasbourg Court uses the “totality 
of circumstances” approach: that is, it will assess if the procedure as a whole has met 
the requirement of fairness. As the ECtHR in Jalloh v. Germany emphasized: “[When 
examining the case under Article 6] (t)he question which must be answered is whether 
the proceedings as a whole (…) were fair.”37 Thus, a particular deficiency in one case 
may amount to a violation of Article 6 of the Convention, while in another case the 
same deficiency will not result in finding a breach of the right to a fair trial since it 
might have been counterbalanced by factors that have guaranteed the overall fairness 
of the procedure.
In the light of this, the added value of Union legislation on procedural rights is that 
standards of fairness can be formulated with sufficient precision on the abstract level 
and also that certain rights that are not explicitly set forth in the ECHR can be 
introduced. I must add, though, that the Strasbourg Court in the past made a pretty 
good job in identifying so-called implied rights which are inevitable components of 
fairness. These include among others the equality of arms principle, the right to silence 
and the right to a reasoned judgment.
35 See Jörg Polakiewicz: Durchsetzung von EMRK- Standards mit Hilfe des EU-Rechts? EuGRZ, vol. 
37, no. 1–5 (2010), p.15.
36 See par. 71 of the report adopted by the Commission on 10 May 1994. Saunders v. the United 
Kingdom 19187/91 (17/12/1996), Reports 1996-VI.
37 Jalloh v. Germany [GC] 54810/00 (11/07/2006), Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2006-Ix, par. 
95.
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There are of course limits as to the precision of formulating procedural rights in 
Union legislation since it is essential that legislation does not prevent the Strasbourg 
Court in further developing the standards by interpreting the Convention provisions 
in the light of new developments.
5. HARMONIzING ExCLUSIONARy RULES?
Let me conclude by a few comments on the procedural rights listed in Article 82 TFEU 
and those in the directive referred to above. As concerns the latter on the right to 
translation and interpretation, one may say that formally it is aiming at standardization. 
However it does not contribute to harmonizing the status of criminal defendants 
throughout the EU; since it simply calls for ensuring the basic preconditions of a 
criminal process in the proper sense. In my view, it only obliges Member States to 
secure the “infrastructure” for a criminal process which recognizes the defendant as 
a subject and not simply as the object of the procedure. Thus Member States are called 
upon to ensure that a procedure in the proper sense can be conducted. Interpretation 
and translation of essential documents are simply part of the infrastructure, in the 
same way as court buildings or clerks.
By this, however, I do not wish to underestimate the importance of either the 
directive and the stress laid in Article 82 TFEU, or of the “Roadmap” on the specific 
needs of foreign suspects and defendants for the simple reason that it is exactly this 
area where in my view (and in the view of many other commentators) the Strasbourg 
jurisprudence is rather underdeveloped. Article 6 is interpreted as to apply to the 
determination of the “criminal charge” in the narrow sense, that is to the proceedings 
before the authorities that render judgment on the merits of the case. Everything else 
that was undertaken in the context of cooperation between authorities falls outside 
Article 6. Even blatant breaches of international law and human rights may go 
unpunished as the Strasbourg Court still seems to accept the male captus bene 
iudicatus principle.38
Similarly underdeveloped is the Strasbourg jurisprudence in the area of the law of 
evidence. As reiterated in the judgments of the Strasbourg Court, developing the rules 
concerning evidence is a task for domestic law – the evidentiary procedure must take 
place in the “domestic field” and the weighing of the evidence is a task for the national 
judge. It is not up to the ECtHR to assess whether the domestic courts have made 
errors in establishing the facts of the case, it only does so if it finds that the procedure 
38 Stefan Trechsel: Human Rights in Criminal Proceedings. Oxford, 2006, Oxford University Press, pp. 
431–432.
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of the national court was devoid of any rationality and was thus obviously arbitrary.39 
Although the Convention does guarantee the right to a fair trial, it does not contain 
provisions concerning the use of evidence or its exclusion. Such determinations fall 
fundamentally within the competence of the domestic courts.40
The reluctance of the Court to formulate evidentiary principles or rules on 
admissibility has its source in its function and mode of operation. The Court’s task is 
to decide whether in an individual case human rights have been observed or not. As 
to applications alleging the use of unlawful evidence the task of the Court is to 
determine if the admission of illegally obtained evidence rendered the trial unfair. 
The focus on individual cases sets limits to formulating general principles or rules.
What is regrettable is that the ECtHR is quite cautious in finding a violation of 
Article 6 when national courts used evidence that had been obtained in violation of 
domestic law41 or the Convention.42 The EU Network of Independent Experts on 
Fundamental Rights (CFR-CDF) is right in observing that “national rules of criminal 
procedure are more protective of the accused than is required by Article 6(1) of the 
European Convention on Human Rights in this respect.”43
The case law indicates that the admission of confessions obtained in violation of 
Article 3 renders the trial unfair irrespective of whether the treatment amounted to 
torture or inhuman or degrading treatment. Similarly Article 6 is violated if the courts 
use real evidence obtained directly through torture. In these cases the probative value 
of the evidence is irrelevant as well as the weight attached by the courts to the 
confession or the real evidence.44 The ECtHR, however, has so far failed to settle the 
issue of whether the admission of real evidence obtained through violation of 
treatment falling short of torture but still in breach of Article 3 would automatically 
39 In the Vidal case, for instance [Vidal v. Belgium 12351/86 (22/04/1992), A235-B], the Court held that 
rejecting to hear the witnesses requested by the applicant without reason constituted a violation of 
the Convention. See Jochen Frowein – Wolfgang Peukert: Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention: 
EMRK-Kommentar. Kehl-Strassburg-Arlington, 1996, N. P. Engel, p. 312. Also see Papageorgiou v. 
Greece 59506/00 (09/05/2003), Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2003-VI. In this decision the 
Court found a violation of Article 6 (1) and (3) because the national courts refused to allow the 
accused to adduce and have examined evidence that could have acquitted the accused of the charges. 
In contrast, see for example Perna v. Italy [GC] 48898/99 (06/05/2003), Reports of Judgments and 
Decisions 2003-V. The ECtHR accepted the position of the Italian courts, which held that refusing 
to hear the witnesses requested by the accused was justified, because the accused sought to prove 
circumstances through their testimony that were irrelevant with regards to establishing the facts of 
the particular case.
40 Schenk v. Switzerland 10862/84 (12/07/1988), A140, par. 45–46.
41 Schenk v. Switzerland 10862/84 (12/07/1988), A140.
42 Khan v. the United Kingdom 35394/97(02/05/2000), Report of Judgments and Decisions 2000-V.
43 Http://cridho.cpdr.ucl.ac.be/documents/Avis.CFR-CDF/Avis2003/CFR-CDF.opinion3–2003.pdf. 
See p. 6 of the report.
44 Gäfgen v. Germany [GC] 22978/05 (01/06/2010), par.166–167 and 173.
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render the trial unfair. In both Jalloh,45 and Gäfgen46 it concluded that in this case 
compliance with Article 6 is to be considered in the context of the trial as a whole.
If the violation of the absolute right of freedom from torture and inhuman or 
degrading treatment does not automatically result in finding a breach of the right to a 
fair trial then it does not come as a surprise that the use of evidence obtained through 
the breach of qualified rights such as the right to private life will not render the trial a 
fortiori unfair. Not all the judges of the ECtHR are of the view that this approach is the 
correct one. In Schenk, the leading case, the minority drew the attention of the majority 
to the fact that “compliance with the law when taking evidence is not an abstract or 
formalistic requirement. On the contrary, we consider that it is of the first importance 
for the fairness of a criminal trial. No court can, without detriment to the proper 
administration of justice, rely on evidence which has been obtained not only by unfair 
means but, above all, unlawfully. If it does so, the trial cannot be fair within the 
meaning of the Convention.”47 In his dissenting opinion in Khan, Judge Loucaides 
criticized the position of the majority: “The basic argument against such an 
exclusionary rule is the pursuit of the truth and the public interest values in effective 
criminal law enforcement which entail the admission of reliable and trustworthy 
evidence, for otherwise these values may suffer and guilty defendants may escape the 
sanctions of the law”, whereas “breaking the law, in order to enforce it, is a contradiction 
in terms and an absurd proposition.”48 The Court was split in a number of recent 
cases, and several judges expressed serious concerns as to the correctness of their 
colleagues’ reasoning – even if they agreed with the result reached in those cases. In 
Jalloh, Judge Bratza expresses his reservation since the reasoning seemed to suggest 
that in serious cases the admission of real evidence obtained through violation of 
Article 3 would not necessarily render the trial unfair.49 The authors of the concurring 
opinion in Gäfgen blamed the majority for its failure to assert categorically “that 
irrespective of the conduct of an accused, fairness, for the purpose of Article 6, 
presupposes respect for the rule of law and requires, as a self-evident proposition, the 
exclusion of any evidence that has been obtained in violation of Article 3.”50 It is the 
same reason that led Judge Zupančič to mourn the “change in the zeitgeist”: what was 
45 Jalloh v. Germany [GC] 54810/00 (11/07/2006), Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2006-Ix.
46 Gäfgen v. Germany [GC] 22978/05 (01/06/2010).
47 See the joint dissenting opinion of Judges Pettiti, Spielmann, De Meyer and Carillo Salcedo. Schenk 
v. Switzerland 10862/84 (12/07/1988), A140.
48 Khan v. the United Kingdom 35394/97 (04/10/2000), Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2000-V.
49 Jalloh v. Germany [GC] 54810/00 (11/07/2006), Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2006-Ix, 
Concurring opinion of Judge Bratza.
50 Gäfgen v. Germany [GC] 22978/05 (01/06/2010), the partly dissenting opinion of Judges Rozakis, 
Tulkens, Jebens, Ziemele, Bianku and Power, point 2.
Károly Bárd
20 Intersentia
50 years ago something simply intolerable has by now “become an issue that must be 
extensively – and not just in this case – pondered, argued and debated.”51
For all outlined above it is laudable that Article 82 par 2 makes explicit mention of 
the mutual admissibility of evidence between Member States among the areas to be 
harmonized through directives. The Green Paper presented by the Commission in 
November 2009 on obtaining evidence52 envisages the adoption of one single 
instrument that would replace the mutual assistance (like the 1959 Council of Europe53 
or the 2000 EU Convention54 and mutual recognition instruments currently in force). 
In addition it lists the questions the answers to which will determine the direction 
future work will take.
The Statement of the European Criminal Bar Association on the Green Paper55 
indicates one of the directions, namely the approach which fully respects procedural 
rights of defendants involved in criminal matters with a cross-border component, and 
it envisages a model of cooperation between agencies of Member States which lays 
stress on the overall fairness of the entire process.
One can of-course contemplate whether it is presently realistic to demand (for 
instance) the application of all the exclusionary rules of both the issuing and the 
executing state as laid down in the ECBA position paper. One can ask why defendants 
suspected of criminal offenses with a cross-boarder component should be better 
positioned than those whose alleged criminal activity does not trespass national 
borders.
At the same time the ECBA Statement convincingly shows that cooperation 
between the judiciaries, that respects defendants’ rights without discriminating any 
group of defendants, presupposes harmonization of national procedural laws to a 
much larger extent than that which is the case today.
51 Jalloh v. Germany [GC] 54810/00 (11/07/2006), Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2006-Ix, 
concurring opinion of Judge Zupančič (point III).
52 Green Paper on obtaining evidence in criminal matters from one Member State to another and 
securing its admissibility. COM(2009) 624. 11 November 2009.
53 European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (1959). ETS 030.
54 Convention of 29 May 2000 on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the Member States 
of the European Union. 2000/C 197/01, Official Journal C197/1, 12 July 2000.
55 Available at: www.ecba.com.
